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THE PRESENT NEW ANTITRUST ERA
BARAK ORBACH*
ABSTRACT
Antitrust scholars frequently refer to an “ideological pendulum” to
describe the rise and fall of trends in the evolution of antitrust law.
This pendulum arguably swings between fairness and laissez-faire
visions, while a technocracy vision moderates its motion. Mapping
key phases in the evolution of antitrust law, I argue that a new
antitrust era with distinctive characteristics has been forming in
recent years.
The present new antitrust era is a product of growing tensions and
contradictions among policy prescriptions. After several decades in
which antitrust was a specialized field that drew little public at-
tention, in the aftermath of the Great Recession, antitrust became a
proxy for disagreements over economic policies. Today, antitrust law
exemplifies striking discrepancies among positions advanced by the
Supreme Court, the established antitrust technocracy, political
populism, and economics. This resurrection of public and political
interest in antitrust, I argue, marks the end of one antitrust era and
the beginning of another.
* Professor of Law at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. This
Article benefitted from comments and suggestions from the participants in the symposium,
Antitrust and the Constitutional Order, and the editors of William & Mary Law Review. 
1439
1440 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1439
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1441
I. PAST ANTITRUST ERAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1444
A. The Formative Era, 1890-1911. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1444
B. The First Rule of Reason Era, 1911-1935 . . . . . . . . . . . . 1448
C. The Fairness Era, 1935-1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1450
D. The Second Rule of Reason Era, 1975-? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1454
II. THE PRESENT ERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1458
CONCLUSION: THE VIRTUES OF MODERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1462
2019] THE PRESENT NEW ANTITRUST ERA 1441
INTRODUCTION
Three conflicting visions have shaped the evolution of antitrust
law—fairness, laissez faire, and technocracy.1 I examine the evo-
lution of antitrust law through the changes in the popularity and
influence of these visions over the years. I argue that a new anti-
trust era with distinctive characteristics has been forming in recent
years.
The fairness vision builds on a collection of ideas that condemn
business size and portray profit-seeking commercial activities as a
source of undesirable distributive effects.2 Louis Brandeis’s essays
about trusts and combinations epitomize this line of thinking.3
Donald Turner famously described the fairness attitude as “in-
hospitability in the tradition of antitrust law.”4
The laissez-faire vision recognizes that, in theory, restraints of
trade may harm competition, but emphasizes the potential costs of
antitrust enforcement and skepticism of the plausibility and vi-
ability of anticompetitive restraints.5 Frank Easterbrook’s influen-
tial formulation of antitrust’s false positives typifies this line of
thinking.6 Easterbrook hypothesized that, in antitrust, “judicial
errors that tolerate baleful practices are self-correcting, while er-
roneous condemnations are not.”7 The Supreme Court adopted this
conjecture as a guiding principle for antitrust law.8
1. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2008);
William H. Page, The Ideological Origins and Evolution of U.S. Antitrust Law, in 1 ISSUES IN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1, 3-5 (Wayne Dale Collins et al., eds. 2008).
2. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 72-73.
3. Brandeis published some of the essays in a book that focused on the financial sector.
See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT
(1914).
4. Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N ANTITRUST L.
SYMP. 1, 1-2.
5. See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition,
6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (2010).
6. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1984).
7. Id. at 3.
8. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 282 (2007) (“[A]nti-
trust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes.”); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (“Against the slight benefits of
antitrust intervention ... we must weigh a realistic assessment of its costs.”); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588, 594 (1986) (“[A]ntitrust law limits the
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The technocracy vision provides that the exercise of government
functions by experts insulates policies from ideological influences
and populist sentiments, such as fairness and laissez-faire fads.9
Antitrust technocracy rests on two beliefs. First, “antitrust law has
had and still has some undesirable features that the courts or
Congress should correct.”10 Second, the “proper approach [for] gov-
ernment enforcement agencies [is] not to bring cases solely on the
basis that they would be upheld because of past precedents.”11
Rather, the government should bring cases because “they should be
upheld,” including “for the purpose of persuading the Supreme
Court to reverse precedents.”12 Beliefs that antitrust expertise
reached some plateau protected by a broad consensus among
experts have resurfaced several times since the enactment of the
Sherman Act. These beliefs have always been somewhat aspira-
tional and much exaggerated. A technocracy hype during the 1920s
and 1930s inspired the idea of antitrust technocracy.13 Then,
antitrust technocracy struggled with incoherent and conflicting
policies.14
In 1964, when the fairness vision dominated antitrust law,
Richard Hofstadter argued that with the “growing public acceptance
of the large corporation,” antitrust had “lost its role in our society”
and became “the almost exclusive concern of a technical elite of
lawyers and economists.”15 Similarly, in 1979, as the laissez-faire
vision was ascending, Richard Posner claimed that “a shift from
disagreement over basic premises, methodology, and ideology to-
ward technical disagreements” built a “growing consensus” among
range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence” because “mistaken inferences in
[antitrust] cases ... are especially costly, [as] they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are
designed to protect.”). See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error out of “Error Cost”
Analysis: What’s Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2015). 
9. See generally John G. Gunnell, The Technocratic Image and the Theory of Technocracy,
23 TECH. & CULTURE 392 (1982).
10. Donald D. Turner, The Virtues and Problems of Antitrust Law, 35 ANTITRUST BULL.
297, 297 (1990).
11. Id. at 297-98.
12. Id. at 298.
13. See Gunnell, supra note 9, at 392-93.
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement? Notes on the Evo-
lution of an American Creed, in THE BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT 113, 113, 115, 151 (Earl F.
Cheit ed., 1964).
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antitrust experts.16 In the past two decades, however, many anti-
trust experts argued that the decline of the Chicago School in the
1990s allowed professional technocracy to replace antitrust ideology,
contributing to nuanced and balanced antitrust enforcement.17
Nonetheless, the present technocracy has been facing an ideological
jurisprudence that has persistently narrowed the substantive scope
of antitrust law.18 Since the Great Recession, antitrust enforcement
has been facing growing criticism for its permissible standards and
neglect of the rising concentration in the economy.19
The digital revolution, which began in the mid-1970s, gave new
life to old fears of large businesses and beliefs that antitrust law
should address the wealth effects caused by a rapid technological
change.20 These sentiments grew considerably in the aftermath of
the Great Recession.21 Commentators with varying degrees of
expertise and understanding of antitrust law reintroduced the
public to old beliefs that antitrust law could resolve many economic
problems. Resentments of the new economic elite and its impact on
society, as well as criticism of the technocracy that allegedly
neglected the changes in the economy, offered political capital for
attacks on the establishment and various elites. While it is far from
clear that these sentiments and the recent populist surge will
16. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925,
925 (1979).
17. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM ’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at x
(2007), https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MW7B-WR3N]; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 1 (2005);
Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 522-23
(2006); Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2543 (2013); William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2003); William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro,
Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2000,
at 43, 46-49; Robert T. Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: A View
from the Middle, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 583 (2002); Steven C. Salop, What Consensus? Why
Ideology and Elections Still Matter to Antitrust, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 601 (2014); Theodore
Voorhees, Jr., The Political Hand in American Antitrust: Invisible, Inspirational, or Imag-
inary?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 557, 565-66 (2014).
18. See infra Part II.D.
19. See, e.g., The Next Capitalist Revolution, ECONOMIST (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.
economist.com/leaders/2018/11/15/the-next-capitalist-revolution [https://perma.cc/3YB9-2V
KX].
20. See id.
21. See id.
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dramatically influence antitrust policies, they demand reevalua-
tion of antitrust law. Examined in the context of the evolution of
antitrust law, the recent developments, I argue, account for the
beginning of a new antitrust era.
I. PAST ANTITRUST ERAS
Antitrust law has evolved through four primary phases: (1) the
formative era (1890-1911); (2) the first rule of reason era (1911-
1935); (3) the fairness era (1935-1975); and (4) the second rule of
reason era (1975 to some point in recent years). Each phase began
and ended gradually, rather than through events that established
sharp turns in the direction of antitrust law. Thus, references to the
beginning and end of each period are somewhat imprecise. Corre-
spondingly, descriptions of transition points in the literature are not
uniform, yet hardly present meaningful disagreements among
scholars.
A. The Formative Era, 1890-1911
Antitrust’s formative era took place from the 1890 enactment of
the Sherman Act to the 1911 adoption of the rule of reason. During
this period general antitrust norms formed through judicial inter-
pretations of the Sherman Act. These norms utilized public re-
straints on businesses to protect the vitality of markets from private
restraints of trade. The process produced debates and controversies
over the constitutionality and reach of the Sherman Act.22 Standard
Oil (1911) and American Tobacco (1911) concluded the core contro-
versies.23 In each case, the Court ordered the dissolution of a mas-
sive trust, demonstrating that the Sherman Act may be used to im-
pose meaningful restrictions on businesses.24 At the same time, the
Court used both decisions to soften the sweeping language of the
22. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 100-237 (1965).
23. The Supreme Court handed down both decisions in the second half of May 1911.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911).
24. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 72-74; Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 181.
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Sherman Act, ruling that only “unreasonable” restraints of trade vi-
olate the Sherman Act.25
The impetus for the enactment of antitrust legislation in the
United States was the Second Industrial Revolution that took place
from 1870 to 1914.26 New technologies enabled, for the first time in
history, the development of mass production and mass distribution
in many industries.27 Industrial giants emerged and displaced small
businesses, automation eliminated numerous jobs, and tensions
between capital and labor soared.28 The enactment of the Sherman
Act responded to growing public demands to address the influence
of large businesses on the economy, then known as the “trust
problem.”29 Nonetheless, the Sherman Act was a “curious phenome-
non.”30 A Republican Congress supportive of the trusts passed anti-
trust legislation.31 When the Sherman Act was drafted and debated,
the Republican Party controlled the White House and Congress.32
The party was “dominated ... by many of the very industrial mag-
nates most vulnerable to real antitrust legislation.”33 The idea of
antitrust measures, thus, had a broad public support but was not a
high priority for the Republican Party. Rather, under a Republican
leadership, Congress focused on tariffs that protected American
monopolies from competition.34 As a result, the Sherman Act was
anything but well-considered legislation.35
During antitrust’s formative era, courts developed general
standards for the interpretation of antitrust law. Most importantly,
the Supreme Court ruled that the Sherman Act prohibits only
25. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 54-55.
26. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., SCALE AND SCOPE 51-53 (1990).
27. See id. at 53-56.
28. See id. at 194-96.
29. See LETWIN, supra note 22, at 7.
30. MERLE FAINSOD & LINCOLN GORDON, GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 450
(1948).
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See generally JOANNE REITANO, THE TARIFF QUESTION IN THE GILDED AGE: THE GREAT
DEBATE OF 1888 (1994).
35. HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 164-224 (1954); see also United
States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897) (“[It is] impossible to say what
were the views of a majority of the members of each house in relation to the meaning of the
[Sherman Act].”)
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unreasonable restraints of trade, not all restraints,36 and that re-
straints of trade may include mergers and restraints on pro-
duction.37 Notably, the Supreme Court also adopted a per se rule—a
ban on resale price maintenance (RPM).38 In a nonantitrust case,
New York Central Railroad (1909), the Supreme Court held that
corporations might be criminally liable for acts committed by em-
ployees acting within the scope of their employment.39 This ruling
is one of the most consequential decisions of the Court, establishing
a path for criminal prosecution of businesses.
Trusts at the Senate
The Bosses of the Senate, Puck, January 1889.
Depicting a wide open “entrance for monopolists,” a bolted and barred small
“people’s entrance,” a sign stating “This is the Senate of the Monopolists by the
Monopolists and for the Monopolists!,” and the large trusts looming over small
senators.
36. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 54 (adopting the rule of reason). 
37. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904), overruling United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that unlawful restraints of trade may include restraints
of production and mergers).
38. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
39. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
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Many scholars have pointed out that the formative era of an-
titrust law and the formative era of laissez-faire constitutionalism
overlapped.40 The formative era of laissez-faire constitutionalism
was longer, stretching from The Slaughter-House Cases (1873) to
West Coast Hotel (1937),41 with Lochner (1905) symbolizing the era
and its spirit.42 It began before the enactment of the Sherman Act
and defined the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence long after the
formative era of antitrust law ended. The overlap accounts for the
limited effectiveness of the fairness vision during antitrust’s for-
mative era. Rising antitrust sentiments pressured politicians
across the political spectrum to condemn large businesses.43 The
Supreme Court, however, was captured by laissez-faire senti-
ments.44 Importantly, in Santa Clara (1886), the Court declared
that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to protect corporations, not only “natural persons.”45 But,
as Justice Black pointed out (decades after Santa Clara), “[n]either
the history nor the language of the Fourteenth Amendment justi-
fies the belief that corporations are included within its protection.”46
40. Alan Meese wrote the two most significant works on this point. Alan J. Meese,
Standard Oil As Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783 (2012); Alan J. Meese, Liberty
and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1999); see also RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ,
COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992, at 9-58 (rev. ed. 2000); James May, Antitrust in
the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis,
1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257 (1989); James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the
Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 495 (1987).
41. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 83-101 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting);
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). The Slaughter-House Cases addressed the
question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect business interests.
Writing for the Court, Justice Miller wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment’s “pervading
purpose” was “the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of
those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.” The Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. at 71. 
42. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See generally Meese, Liberty and Antitrust
in the Formative Era, supra note 40.
43. See Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2257-68
(2013).
44. Several scholars documented ethical conflicts and ideological rigidity that defined
Justice Stephen Field, a laissez-faire icon. See, e.g., Howard Jay Graham, Justice Field and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 52 YALE L.J. 851, 870, 874-875 (1943).
45. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U. S. 394, 409 (1886).
46. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85-86 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting).
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The far-reaching effects of this constitutional interpretation con-
tinue to shape national economic policies.47
B. The First Rule of Reason Era, 1911-1935
Antitrust’s first rule of reason era took place from 1911 to the
1935 invalidation of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
which partially suspended the enforcement of the antitrust laws.48
During this period, the Supreme Court developed reasonableness
standards primarily to narrow the scope of antitrust law.49 In 1914,
Congress passed the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
Acts responding to concerns that the rule of reason emasculated
the Sherman Act.50
Two threads of ideas curbed antitrust enforcement during the
first rule of reason era. First, the majority of the Supreme Court
Justices were committed to laissez-faire constitutionalism and saw
in antitrust enforcement a threat to economic liberties. Second,
critics of the trusts advanced theories about “new competition” as
an alternative to “crude and brutal competition.”51
Proponents of laissez-faire constitutionalism successfully oppos-
ed prosecution of dominant firms.52 For example, in United Shoe
(1918),53 Colgate (1919),54 U.S. Steel (1920),55 and Kodak (1927),56
47. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
48. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking down
NIRA). See generally PERITZ, supra note 40, at 59-110; Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 17, at
46-49.
49. See, e.g., Hofstadter, supra note 15, at 115 (naming the period the “era of neglect”). 
50. See Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 12-17 (2012)); Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 42-58 (2012)).
51. ARTHUR JEROME EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION 59-79 (1914); see also LAURA PHILLIPS
SAWYER, AMERICAN FAIR TRADE 149-95 (2018).
52. PERITZ, supra note 40, at 59-110; Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 17, at 46-49 (arguing
that the era represented “the longest lapse for the enforcement of antitrust controls on
dominant firm behavior”).
53. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918) (rejecting the possibility
that a dominant firm had the power to coerce customers to accept its terms).
54. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (establishing the right to uni-
lateral refusal to deal).
55. United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (refusing to condemn a dom-
inant firm that had competitors).
56. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927) (finding that acquisitions of a
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the Supreme Court dismissed claims that dominant firms violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. At the same time, beliefs that
collaborations among competitors could combat the illnesses of
industrialization and protect democracy made heavy inroads into
antitrust law. “Associationalism,” also known as the “fair trade
movement,” was an influential political-economic movement that
prescribed collaborations among competitors through civic associa-
tions, such as trade associations, professional societies, labor
unions, and cooperatives, to promote constructive competition.57
Consistent with this vision, the federal government actively en-
couraged collaborations among competitors and courts developed
the rule of reason in a pursuit of an elusive distinction between
constructive and destructive collaborations among competitors.58
NIRA’s “codes of fair competition” and suspension of antitrust
restrictions on collaborations among competitors were products of
this vision.59 Many antitrust landmarks from the era examine the
legality of various collaborations among competitors and, specifi-
cally, “open price associations.”60 For example, Chicago Board of
Trade (1918) examined trading rules that a commodity exchange set
for its members;61 U.S. Steel (1920) concerned, in part, social events
in which steel executives exchanged information;62 Eastern States
(1914), American Column & Lumber (1921), and Maple Flooring
(1925) examined information exchanges and other collaborative
standards of trade associations;63 National League (1922) created
the so-called Baseball Exemption;64 Pacific States Paper Trade
(1927) condemned price-fixing arrangements of trade associations;65
dominant firm were unlawful but disapproving the FTC’s order of divestiture).
57. SAWYER, supra note 51.
58. See David M. Hart, Herbert Hoover’s Last Laugh: The Enduring Significance of the
“Associative State” in the United States, 10 J. POL’Y HIST. 419 (1998).
59. See E. W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).
60. See Gerald Berk, Communities of Competitors: Open Price Associations and the
American State, 1911-1929, 20 SOC. SCI. HIST. 375 (1996).
61. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 237-41 (1918).
62. United States v. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 440 (1920); see William H. Page, The Gary
Dinners and the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 S.M.U. L. REV. 597 (2009).
63. E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Am.
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); Maple Flooring Mfrs.’ Ass’n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
64. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
65. FTC v. Pac. States Paper Trade Ass’n, 273 U.S. 52, 62 (1927).
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Trenton Potteries (1927) held that price-fixing by a trade associa-
tion was unlawful per se;66 Paramount Famous Lasky (1930) re-
viewed the legality of mandatory arbitration clauses set by a trade
association;67 Standard Oil (1931) upheld a patent pool;68 and
Appalachian Coals (1933) upheld the legality of a miners’ coopera-
tive.69
“Open price associations,” namely, information exchanges among
competitors that were loosely affiliated through a trade organiza-
tion, were one of the key mechanisms that associationalists
promoted; these associations intended to “stabilize” prices and
prevent “unfair competition.”70 The Supreme Court evaluated the
legality of open price associations in several instances.71 Although
the Court initially condemned the concept, it became tolerant of
open competition during the 1920s.72
The first rule of reason era, therefore, illustrates how conflicting
visions may coexist in antitrust law and even evolve simultaneously.
It also demonstrates that a technocracy may go astray.
C. The Fairness Era, 1935-1975
Antitrust’s fairness era emerged from the repudiation of laissez-
faire constitutionalism and the collapse of the associative state
vision. It took place from the 1935 demise of the NIRA to the 1975
retirement of Justice William Douglas, who was the most dogmatic
advocate of the fairness vision on the Supreme Court to date.73
The Sugar Institute (1936) may be the most important landmark
representing the transition from the first rule of reason era to the
66. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
67. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930).
68. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 154-55, 163 (1931).
69. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933).
70. See, e.g., EDDY, supra note 51, at 118-45.
71. See, e.g., Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Maple Flooring Mfrs.’
Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); United States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S.
371 (1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
72. Am. Linseed Oil, 262 U.S. 371; Am. Column & Lumber, 257 U.S. 377; E. States, 234
U.S. 600.
73. See C. Paul Rogers III, The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas, 56 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 895 (2008). 
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fairness era.74 The case concerned a trade association of sugar re-
finers that operated an elaborate system for information exchange.75
The government argued that the information exchange facilitated
price fixing and sought to dissolve the trade association.76 The
government filed its complaint in 1931, about two years before
Congress enacted the NIRA.77 The case reached the Supreme Court,
which delivered a victory to the government in 1936, almost a year
after the Court struck down the NIRA.78 The Sugar Institute was
the most complex antitrust case since Standard Oil (1911) and the
most significant attack on trade associations.
In January 1935, a few months before the Supreme Court struck
down the NIRA, the Justice Department filed criminal charges
against an alleged conspiracy among film distributors. It described
the action, known as the St. Louis Trust Case, as the “most far-
reaching antitrust action in many years,”79 and “an ‘anti-monopolis-
tic’ campaign ... to convince all American business that the antitrust
laws had not been entirely suspended through the liberties granted
by the National Industrial Recovery Act.”80 The Justice Department
also emphasized that President Roosevelt approved the action.81 The
declarations were exaggerated. The St. Louis Trust Case was not
nearly as complex as The Sugar Institute and ended in defeat for the
government.82 Its promotion as a campaign intending to revive con-
fidence in antitrust law, however, marks a transition from the
limited enforcement of the first rule of reason era to aggressive
antitrust enforcement. Other lawsuits challenging the legality of
74. Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
75. See David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and Collusion:
Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 379 (2001).
76. Sugar Inst., 297 U.S. at 579-81.
77. Id. at 596.
78. Id. at 553.
79. U.S. Government Starts Anti-Trust Suits Against Producers in St. Louis, FILM BULL.,
Jan. 8, 1935, at 2. 
80. See St. Louis Grand Jury Quiz Based on “Freezing” Films, MOTION PICTURE HERALD,
Jan. 12, 1935, at 11.
81. See, e.g., St. Louis Probe as Test if Trust Laws Live, MOTION PICTURE DAILY, Jan. 8,
1935, at 1 (“Fortified by President Roosevelt’s support, the Department of Justice is out to
show industry and the nation at large that the anti-trust laws have survived the New Deal.”).
82. See Jury Acquits Defendants in St. Louis Trust Case, MOTION PICTURE DAILY, Nov. 12,
1935, at 1 (“Every resource of the Department of Justice has been brought to bear to prove
conspiracy in restraint of trade.”).
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arrangements in the spirit of associationalism were more suc-
cessful.83
During the fairness era, antitrust law and policy premised that
large businesses and vertical arrangements tend to exclude com-
petition,84 that horizontal market arrangements tend to be col-
lusive,85 that intellectual property rights convey monopoly power,86
and that the corporate form defines the boundaries of economic
units.87 Guided by these premises, antitrust law in the fairness era
was hostile toward defendants and enforced aggressively. Signifi-
cant developments that represent the spirit of the fairness era
included the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act, which protected small
businesses;88 the 1950 Celler-Kefauver Act, which was an anti-
merger statute;89 the 1968 merger guidelines, which formulated
economic standards for merger review; the adoption of presumptions
about competitive harm, such as per se rules that outlawed hor-
izontal and vertical arrangements,90 the Philadelphia National
Bank (PNB) presumption, which states that horizontal mergers that
increase concentration harm competition,91 and the presumption
83. See, e.g., Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (complaint
filed in April 1936); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (action filed
in December 1936); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (action filed
in December 1936). 
84. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967);
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131
(1948); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United States v. Aluminum Corp. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy,
Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Int’l Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
88. Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (2012)).
89. Celler-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
90. See, e.g., Topco, 405 U.S. 596; United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967); Sealy, 388 U.S. 350; Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959);
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. 392; United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
91. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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that intellectual property rights convey market power;92 the de-
velopment of conspiracy inference standards, which offered some
guidance for proof of conspiracy with circumstantial evidence;93
doctrinal standards for the relationship between antitrust and
regulation;94 and repudiation of the associative state vision.95
Throughout the fairness era, courts praised aggressive antitrust
enforcement, likening antitrust law to constitutional law and de-
scribing antitrust as the “Magna Carta of free enterprise” and a
“charter of economic liberty.”96 Courts also used similar analogies
before and after the fairness era but less forcefully.97
92. See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Int’l Salt, 332 U.S. 392.
93. See, e.g., Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). 
94. See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Phila. Nat’l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (expanding the scope of the implied immunity doctrine); E. R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (establishing the
antitrust petitioning immunity); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (establishing the state
action immunity); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) (adopting the implied
immunity doctrine).
95. See, e.g., Fasion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Socony-
Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150; Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); see also Find
Trust Abuses in Sugar Institute, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1936, at 1 (arguing that The Sugar
Institute decision would “vitally affect the course of 2,000 trade associations”).
96. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 291 (1972); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (describing antitrust law as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise” and
stating that antitrust law is “as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our
free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms”); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (“Every violation of the
antitrust laws is a blow to the free-enterprise system.”); United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 675 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the antitrust laws
express the “philosophy of the free enterprise”); Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 372
(“[C]ompetition is our fundamental national economic policy.”); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter
of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.”);
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 385 (1956) (“The Sherman Act
has received long and careful application ... to achieve for the Nation the freedom of
enterprise.”); Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 221 (characterizing the Sherman Act as a “charter
of freedom”); Sugar Inst., 297 U.S. at 600 (“[T]he Sherman Act, as a charter of freedom, has
a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions.”).
97. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015);
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 225 (2013); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.,
504 U.S. 621, 632 (1992); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 350 (1987); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 651 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 538 n.38 (1983); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 (1982); Cal.
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Antitrust commentators often describe the years of the Warren
Court (1953-1969) as a distinctive period in antitrust history.98 The
Warren Court was suspicious of businesses and distrustful of mar-
kets. It understood “competition” to mean markets with large num-
bers of small competitors, and thus, was particularly hostile toward
mergers and acquisitions.99 The fairness vision, however, dominated
antitrust policies for two decades before Chief Justice Earl Warren
was confirmed and for a few years after Warren’s retirement.
Since the rise of the Chicago School, the fairness vision has been
a popular punching bag of antitrust commentators. Critiques of the
era emphasize its incoherent goals and enforcement zeal. This zeal,
however, rested on then-popular economic theories that tied market
structure to competition (the structure-conduct-performance para-
digm).100
D. The Second Rule of Reason Era, 1975-?
Antitrust’s second rule of reason era began in the mid-1970s
and its spirit still dominates antitrust law. Future studies will
identify events that would symbolize the end of the era. Several
antitrust landmarks symbolize the beginning of the era. General
Dynamics (1974) approved a challenged merger, effectively ending
the fairness era’s hostility toward mergers.101 The 1976 Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act turned merger review into an
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980); City of
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 n.16 (1978); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d
278, 284 (4th Cir. 2012); In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 299 (4th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Azzarelli Constr. Co., 612 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1979); Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1979).
98. See Thomas E. Kauper, The “Warren Court” and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics,
Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 325 (1968) (“No one could quarrel with the
simple assertion that the so-called “Warren Court” has had a significant, if indeed not
extraordinary, impact on the development of the antitrust laws.”); Tony A. Freyer, What Was
Warren Court Antitrust?, 2009 S. CT. REV. 347, 347.
99. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579-80 (1967); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 547-48 (1966); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
270, 278-79 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-20 (1962).
100. See Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1104 (1979).
101. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501 (1974).
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administrative process.102 But more than anything else, three 1977
Supreme Court decisions declared the change in attitude—GTE
Sylvania, Brunswick, and Illinois Brick.103 GTE Sylvania held that
courts should apply the rule of reason to nonprice vertical restraints
and declared that “demonstrable economic effect rather than ... for-
malistic line drawing” should direct antitrust analysis.104 Brunswick
introduced the antirust injury doctrine,105 and Illinois Brick in-
troduced the direct purchaser doctrine.106 I call this period the “sec-
ond rule of reason era” because a defining characteristic of the era
is the growing use of reasonableness standards to narrow the scope
of antitrust law.
The most persistent characteristic of the second rule of reason era
is the Supreme Court’s capture by laissez-faire ideas, which has
been growing with the changes in the composition of the Court.
Since the mid-1970s, and at a faster pace since the confirmation of
Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court has expanded corporate
rights at the expense of individual rights.107 Vast literature exam-
ines this drift, mostly with sharp criticism. Legal historians broadly
agree that the Supreme Court’s adoption and development of consti-
tutional corporate rights have been neither informed nor thought-
ful.108 Likewise, corporate scholars have been critical of the Court’s
interpretation of corporate rights. For example, Leo Strine, the
102. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383.
103. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 41-42, 59 (1977); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
104. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 59. 
105. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
106. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 729-36.
107. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Am. Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013) (Amex 2013); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S.
552 (2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978). See generally ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS (2013); ADAM WINKLER,
WE THE CORPORATIONS (2018); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment:
History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223 (2015); Lee Epstein et al., How
Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013).
108. See generally John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality,
35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926); Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371 (1938); Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the
Fourteenth Amendment: 2, 48 YALE L.J. 171 (1938); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited:
The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); Andrew C. McLaughlin,
The Court, The Corporation, and Conkling, 46 AM. HIST. REV. 45 (1940).
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Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, published a series of
articles questioning the soundness of the Supreme Court’s claims
about corporations and corporate law.109 The evolution of antitrust
law has closely followed this trend.
Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has persistently nar-
rowed the substantive scope of antitrust law, adopting procedural
barriers, and dismantling doctrines associated with the fairness
vision.110 Among other things, the Court moved from glorification to
skepticism of the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, emphasiz-
ing concerns regarding the costs of false positives;111 replaced per se
rules with the rule of reason;112 abandoned exaggerated concerns
about exclusionary practices in favor of skepticism of the viability
of exclusionary conduct;113 reversed judicial premises regarding the
competitive effects of unilateral conduct and vertical restraints;114
overruled the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine;115 withdrew from
the premise that intellectual property rights convey market pow-
er;116 reinterpreted the implied immunity doctrine to trim the reach
of antitrust law;117 and piled up procedural standards that are fa-
vorable to antitrust defendants.118
109. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of
Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71 (2015); Leo E.
Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Tension Between Con-
servative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2015); Leo
E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts’ Role in Eroding “We the People’s” Ability
to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 423 (2016); Leo E. Strine,
Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling Citizens United
with Corporate Law History, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 877 (2016).
110. See Barak Orbach, Antitrust Stare Decisis, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2015. 
111. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
112. See Orbach, supra note 110.
113. See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. 398; Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
114. See, e.g., Pac. Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009);
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc.
v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2006); Bus. Elect. Corp. v. Sharp Elect. Corp., 485
U.S. 717 (1988); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Cont’l T. V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
115. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010); Copperweld v. Indep. Tube, 467 U.S. 752
(1984).
116. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006).
117. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Trinko, 540 U.S. 398.
118. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013); Bell Atl. Corp.
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Although the transformation of antitrust law in recent decades
has been consistent with changes in the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence, antitrust scholars tend to credit the so-called Chicago School
with the reorientation of antitrust law.119 The Chicago School pro-
duced an elegant and accessible analytical framework that supports
laissez-faire sentiments. It offered economics as the only legitimate
methodology for antitrust analysis and promoted a false equivalence
between economics and laissez faire. The Chicago School dominated
antitrust thinking in the 1970s and 1980s and still guides the
antitrust narrative of the Supreme Court. Most antitrust scholars,
however, distance themselves from the broad and unqualified claims
of the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis. Herbert Hovenkamp
coined the term “post-Chicago economics” to describe the growing
differences between the evolving antitrust economics and the rigid
Chicago School’s framework.120
Several decisions of the Supreme Court from the 1990s, chiefly
Kodak (1992) and California Dental Association (1999),121 inspired
beliefs (or hopes) that the Court was moving away from the Chicago
School framework toward post-Chicago economics. These beliefs
proved mistaken. While the Court’s use of a quasi-economics nar-
rative is celebrated in certain political and ideological circles, it has
little to do with contemporary antitrust economics.
In sum, the second rule of reason era is typically described as a
product of a stunning takeover of antitrust law by laissez-faire ideas
that scholars associated with the Chicago School promoted.122 It is,
however, important to recognize that the so-called “Chicago School
revolution” mostly offered rationales for ideological preferences that
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Ill. Brick Co.
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
119. See, e.g., ROBERT PITOFSKY ED., HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK
(2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1985)
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago]; Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago
Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257 [hereinafter Hovenkamp,
Post-Chicago Antitrust].
120. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, supra note 119; Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago
Antitrust, supra note 119.
121. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Cal. Dental Ass’n
v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
122. See, e.g., PITOFSKY, supra note 119.
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have guided the Supreme Court in recent decades and are likely to
continue dominating the Court in the foreseeable future.
II. THE PRESENT ERA
Dramatic changes in the economy and attitudes toward antitrust
law suggest that a new antitrust era is already here. No longer is
antitrust law a neglected specialized area. The digital revolution
that began in the mid-1970s revived old debates about how society
should address disrupting technologies, large corporations, and
economic disparities.123 Renewed fairness sentiments captured the
public in the aftermath of the Great Recession, offering political
and attention capital for populist voices that demand “fair trade”
and action against large corporations. The resurrection of the fair-
ness vision, however, is yet to influence the direction of antitrust
policy. There are no signs that the Supreme Court is about to revisit
its approach to antitrust. Antitrust enforcement during the Trump
Administration lost vigor, with the exception of actions that appear
politically motivated.124 Nonetheless, tensions between influential
laissez-faire sentiments and public anxieties have empowered voices
demanding reevaluation of antitrust policies.
Long-term trends triggered by the digital revolution parallel
trends caused by the Second Industrial Revolution at the turn of the
nineteenth century.125 Both waves of rapid technological change
signify a transition from an “old economy” to a “new economy.”126
The new economy of the Second Industrial Revolution is today’s old
economy.127 In both periods, the organization of production and
123. See, e.g., The Next Capitalist Revolution, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2018, at 13; Trust-
busting in the 21st Century, ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 2018; Ryan Avent, The Third Great Wave,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2014. See generally ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND
MACHINE AGE (2014); ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., INVENTING THE ELECTRONIC CENTURY (2001);
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Industrial Revolutions and Institutional Arrangements, 33 BULL. AM.
ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 33 (1980); Andrew Kupfer, The Race to Rewire America, FORTUNE, Apr. 19,
1993, at 42; Roy B. Helfgott, America’s Third Industrial Revolution, 29 CHALLENGE 41 (1986);
Machine of the Year: A New World Dawns, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 12; Gene Bylinsky, A New
Industrial Revolution, FORTUNE, Oct. 5, 1981, at 106.
124. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018).
125. See Barak Orbach, Antitrust Populism, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 15-17 (2017).
126. See, e.g., The New Economy: Work in Progress, ECONOMIST, July 24, 1999, at 21; The
New Economy, TIME, May 30, 1983, at 62.
127. See, e.g., Carol A. Corrado & Charles R. Hulten, How Do You Measure a “Technological
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distribution in the economy radically changed,128 new forms of busi-
nesses appeared,129 business titans emerged and acquired control
over large segments of the economy,130 concentration in markets
soared,131 income and wealth inequalities grew,132 automation re-
shaped labor markets,133 productivity growth rates were disappoint-
ing,134 social discontent and anxieties dramatically increased,135
Revolution”?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 99 (2010); Robert J. Gordon, Does the “New Economy”
Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (Fall 2000). See
generally Francesco Caselli, Technological Revolutions, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 78 (1999).
128. See, e.g., The World’s Most Valuable Resource, ECONOMIST, May 6, 2017, at 9; Fuel of
the Future, ECONOMIST, May 6, 2017, at 19; Tom Standage, Special Report: The Return of the
Machinery Question, ECONOMIST, June 25, 2016. 
129. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 2 (1932); GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION
(2016); BBVA, REINVENTING THE COMPANY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2015); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE
CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916 (1988); WILLIAM H. WHITE,
JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956); Carl Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern
Corporation, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 311 (1957); Oliver E. Williamson, The Modern Corporation:
Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 19 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1537 (1981).
130. See, e.g., Jonathan Taplin, Can the Tech Giants Be Stopped?, WALL ST. J., July 15-16,
2017, at C1; Derek Thompson, America’s Monopoly Problem, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2016, at 26;
Adrian Wooldridge, Special Report: The Rise of the Superstars, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 2016.
131. See, e.g., S. TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., 76TH CONG., TECHNOLOGY IN OUR ECONOMY
(1941); THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940); NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX,
THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS, 1895-1904 (1985); The Problem With
Profits, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2016, at 11; Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26,
2016, at 23; Survival of the Biggest, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012, at 11.
132. See, e.g., S. TEMP. NAT’L ECON. COMM., 76TH CONG., CONCENTRATION AND COMPOSITION
INDIVIDUAL INCOMES, 1918-1937 (1940); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INEQUALITY:
A HIDDEN COST OF MARKET POWER (2017); David H. Autor, Skills, Education, and the Rise of
Earnings Inequality Among the “Other 99 Percent”, 344 SCI. 843 (2014); David H. Autor et al.,
Computing Inequality: Have Computers Changed the Labor Market?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1169
(1998); David H. Autor et al., Measuring and Interpreting Trends in Economic Inequality: The
Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 189 (2006); Normal Inequalities of
Fortune, N. REPUBLIC, Feb. 6, 1915, at 5.
133. See, e.g., W. GOODWIN MOODY, OUR LABOR DIFFICULTIES (1878); P.M. Baldwin,
Technological Unemployment, 40 SCI. MONTHLY 44 (1935); T.N. Carver, Machinery and the
Laborers, 22 Q.J. ECON. 210 (1908); John Bates Clark, The Moral Outcome of Labor Troubles,
9 N. ENGLANDER & YALE REV. 553 (1886); Burton J. Hendrick, Fitting the Man to the Job,
HARPER’S MAG., Dec. 1916, at 64; Wassily Leontief, Is Technological Unemployment
Inevitable?, 22 CHALLENGE 48 (1979); Michael B. Scheler, Technological Unemployment, 154
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 17 (1931); Better, Stronger, Faster, ECONOMIST, Mar. 3,
2018, at 66; Ram Charan, The Algorithmic CEO, FORTUNE, Feb. 1, 2015, at 45; The Future of
Work, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 26, 2017; Derek Thompson, A World Without Work, ATLANTIC,
July 2015, at 51; Workers on Tap, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2015, at 9.
134. See, e.g., MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44543,
SLOW GROWTH IN THE CURRENT U.S. ECONOMIC EXPANSION (2016); S. TEMP. NAT’L ECON.
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populist movements influenced the political process and public pol-
icies,136 and laissez-faire sentiments dominated the jurisprudence of
the Supreme Court.
The similarities between present conditions and the conditions at
the turn of the nineteenth century offer a glimpse into the likely
future of antitrust law. In both periods, the disruption of markets
and transformation of the economy resulted in a skewed distribution
of gains and losses. A few accumulated vast fortunes and economic
power, while many suffered losses and were unable to integrate in
the new economy.137 This pattern of growing economic disparities,
in turn, proved conducive to public anxieties, social discontent,
radical populism, and ill-conceived public policies.138 In both periods,
the Supreme Court blundered into radical laissez-faire constitu-
tionalism. The Court’s jurisprudence at the turn of the nineteenth
century, which became known as Lochnerism, earned broad con-
demnation and repudiation.139 The Court’s jurisprudence in recent
decades is likely to follow a similar path. The Court is already
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perceived as ideological, hostile to public restrictions on businesses,
and dismissive of concerns regarding restraints of trade.140
Thus, while it may take time until antitrust law changes direction
again, the present conditions suggest that demands to reorient
antitrust law are likely to grow. If history is any guide, we should
expect to see at least a partial reversal from the landmark develop-
ments of the second rule of reason era. Specifically, doctrines relat-
ed to unilateral conduct, exclusionary practices, vertical restraints,
and conspiracy inference are likely to be modified and become less
protective of antitrust defendants.
The Return of Bigness
The Trust Giant’s Point of View. “What a Funny Little Government,” VERDICT, Jan.
22, 1900, at 8-9.
140. See Coates IV, supra note 107, at 269-70 (comparing the development of corporate
rights in the Lochner era and in recent decades, and arguing that the present expansion of
corporate rights “undermines the rule of law”).
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CONCLUSION: THE VIRTUES OF MODERATION
Antitrust law’s core function is delicate: It imposes restrictions
on economic freedom of businesses to reduce unreasonable harm to
competition caused by restraints of trade that businesses would
otherwise use. The fairness, laissez-faire, and technocracy visions,
which have shaped the evolution of antitrust law, present different
approaches to this function. The fairness vision emphasizes con-
cerns about restraints of trade, the laissez-faire vision focuses on
the costs of antitrust enforcement, and the technocracy vision pre-
sumes that enforcement institutions run by experts effectively
protect market competition.
Commentators identify cycles of zeal in the evolution of antitrust
law and sometimes describe those through pendulum metaphors.141
In the spirit of theses metaphors, it is broadly understood that the
141. See, e.g., Kovacic, The Modern Evolution, supra note 17, at 378-82; Louis B. Schwartz,
Cycles of Antitrust Zeal: Predictability?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 771, 771-73 (1990). 
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second rule of reason era will end sometime. This end, I argue, is al-
ready here, though the transition to a new period may linger be-
cause of the ideological radicalization of the Supreme Court.
